THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, May 29, 1996

POSTPONE THE BOSNIAN ELECTIONS...

By George Soros

I am deeply committed to making the Dayton peace process work. My
foundation, among its many projects, has prepared a $15 million plan
for providing pluralistic TV broadcasting to most of Bosnia prior to
the elections, and the U.S. and European governments have pledged
substantial funds to turn the plan into reality. Yet I feel compelled
to voice a protest against the impending decision of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe to certify that conditions are
suitable for holding "free and fair" elections in Bosnia by September
14.

IMMENSE PRESSURE

The OSCE head of mission in Bosnia, career U.S. diplomat Robert
Frowick, has been under immense pressure from the U.S. government to
issue the certification required under the Dayton Agreement; two of
his top aides have resigned in protest. The International Helsinki
Federation issued a report on May 23 documenting that virtually none
of the conditions spelled out in the Dayton Agreement have been met:

- Indicted war criminals have not been arrested. Gen. Ratko Mladic is
in charge of the Bosnian Serb army, issues all orders and communicates
with the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) commander through an
interpreter. Radovan Karadzic continues to dominate the political
scene, sacking the prime minister of Republika Srpska, Rajko Kasagic,
who was willing to co-operate with the U.N. representative Carl Bildt,
but as a sop to Mr. Bildt, Mr. Karadzic has now promised not to make
any further public appearances

- Freedom of movement remains severely restricted. Although official
boundary checkpoints have been turned over to IFOR, they have been
effectively replaced by mobile checkpoints, where the authorities
representing all three ethnic factions routinely refuse to accept
documents issued by the others. Signatures required to register
political parties cannot be gathered across ethnic lines, hindering
opposition parties seeking to attract a multiethnic constituency. For
instance, the Liberal Democratic Party based in Sarajevo and the Social
Liberal Party based in Banja Luka, which were united before the war and
which are trying to form a common platform, cannot meet or even speak
by telephone because of a lack of phone lines.

- Freedom of expression and independent broadcast and print media are
virtually non-existent in so-called Herzeg Bosna (a Croatian ethnic
enclave within the Bosnian-Croatian Federation) and in Republika
Srpska. The situation is somewhat better in Bosnian territory, with
an independent press in cities such as Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica and
with some independent local TV and radio stations. Under present
conditions the three nationalist parties that rule their separate
entities control the relevant media, giving them an unfair advantage.
The media under their control continue to foment ethnic and religious
hatred, in contradiction of the Dayton Agreement.
- Freedom of association is severely repressed, leaving little chance
for opposition parties to solidify support. The Helsinki Federation
report cites specific instances.

- The failure of the international community to secure the return of
refugees (only about 60,000 out of the estimated 2.4 million have
returned), coupled with election rules that allow people to vote where
they now live, will legitimize the results of ethnic cleansing.

It is easy to understand what drives U.S. policy, but it is less easy
to condone it. The timetable for the Bosnian elections is determined
by the timetable for the withdrawal of IFOR troops, which is governed
by the U.S. Presidential election. President Clinton has of course
made a commitment that U.S. troops would begin returning home by the
end of the year. U.S. voters, who are so far removed from the
problems of Bosnia and not well informed about the issues at stake,
are primarily interested in the question whether the President will
keep his word.

To conduct early elections in Bosnia, it would have been necessary to
arrest the indicted war criminals before the momentum of Dayton
dissipated. But the military has been traumatized by its experience
in Somalia, and the Pentagon refused to accept the mission. The
Clinton administration put its faith in Slbodan Milosevic, but he
could not or would not deliver. To order IFOR into action against the
advice of the military would expose President Clinton to a
pre-election risk that he is determined to avoid.

But to persevere in the present course entails even bigger risks.
Bosnia will set a precedent for the post-Cold War world. By insisting
on going through with the elections we would breech the conditions of
the Dayton peace plan we engineered, provide a blueprint for
legitimating ethnic cleansing and undermine the principles of
international law we sought to establish by creating the War Crimes
Tribunal.

FURTHER CONFLICT

Bosnia cannot be split into separate ethnic entities without further
conflict. The Serbs have carved out a contiguous territory for
themselves (although the area around Brcko remains contested) and the
Croat nationalists of Herzeg Bosna aim at no less. Even the military
concedes that it would be easier to maintain its presence than to
reintroduce troops after fighting has erupted again.

The failure of the international community in Bosnia is already
affecting the behavior of neighboring Yugoslavia and Croatia, and it
will be a source of never-ending recrimination between the U.S. and
Europe. President Clinton may be able to avoid Bosnia becoming an
election issue, but it would surely haunt his second term in office.
___________

Mr. Soros is chairman of the Soros Foundations, a network of
foundations that promote free societies around the world.